Pennsylvania Superior Court Stands By Seatbelt Laws in Gaudio v. Ford Motor Company et al., Pa. Super. (June 1, 2009).
Recently, the Superior Court of Pennsylvania ruled that evidence regarding the failure to wear a seat belt is statutorily inadmissible. Even in a products liability case where causation is at issue, the prohibition of such evidence prevails. This affirmation of law came as the result of an appeal on various evidentiary rulings from a trial court.
On June 20, 2001, the Decedent was driving a Ford F-150 pickup truck at low speed through his neighborhood. He came to an intersection where a stop sign had been knocked down. He applied his breaks, but slid through the intersection and into a ditch. By the time emergency personnel arrived, he was found dead and “out of position” in the passenger seat. At the time of the accident, the truck's airbag deployed, however, the Decedent was not wearing his seatbelt. As a result, the Decedent's pre-impact behavior became a major focus in the case.
The civil action filed against Ford asserted claims in negligence and strict liability. However, the case proceeded to trial on only the strict liability claims. The Decedent's estate attempted to prove the design of the Ford F-150's airbag system was defective, ultimately causing the Decedent's death. The Estate argued that had the airbags worked correctly, the Decedent would have sustained only minor injuries.
Conversely, Ford argued the airbag system operated properly and as designed. Ford further argued it was the Decedent's heavy breaking, failure to wear his seatbelt, and other pre-impact behavior that caused his body to be in an unsafe position, ultimately resulting in his death.
The Decedent's Estate motioned the trial court for an order excluding any evidence regarding the Decedent's failure to wear his seat belt at the time of the accident. The trial court denied the motion, but stated that the parties “shall not be permitted to argue negligence or comparative fault of the decedent.” As a result, Ford was permitted to introduce expert testimony opining the Decedent's failure to wear his seatbelt was a contributing factor in his body being “out of position” and therefore too close to the air bag when it deployed.
In deciding the motion filed by the Decedent's Estate, the trial court considered Pennsylvania's Occupant Protection Act, § 4581 of the Motor Vehicle Code, titled “Restraint Systems,” 75 Pa.C.S.A. Subsection 4581 (a)(2) that requires drivers and front seat passengers to wear a properly adjusted and fastened safety seat belt. Further, 75 Pa.C.S.A. § 4581 (e) addresses the admissibility of evidence of the failure to use a seat belt system in civil actions, specifically stating: “nor shall failure to use a child passenger restraint system or safety belt be considered as contributory negligence nor shall failure to use such a system be admissible as evidence in the trial of any civil action.”
The trial court determined the language of the statute did “not mandate an absolute bar” on evidence of seat belt usage. Specifically, the trial court held that for purposes of proving causation in products liability claims, to disallow such evidence “would be unjust” as such evidence is a key factor in determining whether, or not, the air bag was actually defective. The trial court held the rule only prohibits the use of such evidence to prove contributory negligence.
Ultimately, the jury returned a verdict in favor of Ford on the issue of strict liability and the issues of causation or damages were not decided. The appeal to the Superior Court followed.
The Superior Court divided the evidentiary issues on appeal into various broad categories. The first evidential category addressed seat belt usage. Specifically, the Decedent's Estate again requested the presence or use of the seat belt system in the vehicle not be referenced at trial.
In deciding this matter, the Superior Court, like the trial court, referred to 75 Pa.C.S.A. § 4581 (e). However, to formulate an argument against the trial court's reasoning, the Superior Court also referenced 1 Pa.C.S.A. § 1921(a), which states: “When the words of a statute are clear and free from all ambiguity, the letter of it is not to be disregarded under the pretext of pursuing its spirit.” Additionally, “when the words of a statute are clear and free from all ambiguity, they are presumed to be the best indication of legislative intent.” Chanceford Aviation Properties, L.L.P. v. Chanceford Tp. Bd. Of Supervisors, 592 Pa. 100, 107-08, 923 A.2d 1099, 1104 (2007).
Accordingly, the Superior Court reasoned the language in 75 Pa.C.S.A. § 4581(e) clearly and unambiguously expresses the intent of the Legislature and does not contain any exceptions. Therefore, evidence of non-use of a seat belt should be strictly prohibited in civil actions tried in Pennsylvania Courts.
The Court interpreted the legislative intent to be a blanket exclusion of evidence of seat belt usage in civil actions, including attempts to prove not only contributory negligence, but also defect, causation, and damages. The Court explained the focus of a products liability case must remain on the product and not the conduct of the parties. In other words, the Court refused to read into the statute a meaning that was not expressly stated. Whether or not the application of a blanket exclusion of evidence of seatbelt usage in a products liability case was “unjust,” as the trial court concluded, was not for the trial court or the Superior Court to decide.
Senior Judge James J. Fitzgerald respectfully dissented on the issue of admissibility of evidence of seat belt usage. Specifically, he discerned no error in the trial court's evidentiary rulings regarding the Decedent's failure to wear a seat belt and the Decedent's pre-impact conduct. He reasoned such evidence should be admissible, not to prove contributory negligence, but rather to prove lack of defect and causation.
Judge Fitzgerald's notable dissent may prove helpful in raising numerous public policy questions as a result of this case. For example, should the language of 75 Pa.C.S.A. § 4581 (e) be revised by the Legislature in order to permit evidence of the non-use of seatbelts in certain situations, for instance to prove causation or lack of a defect in product liability cases? Would such a change, after twenty-two years of the current statute being in effect, help to foster justice or result in a loophole for defendant's to escape liability? A related subject matter that may gain extra attention as well is the use or non-use of helmets for motorcyclists.
Purdon's Pennsylvania Statues 75 Pa.C.S.A. § 3525(a), states, “Except as provided in subsection (d)1, no person shall operate or ride upon a motorcycle or a motor-driven cycle... unless he is wearing protective headgear which complies with standards established by the department.” Id. However, unlike the seat-belt laws, there is no corresponding statute or regulation, which prohibits the admission of a violation of Pa.C.S.A. § 3525(a) into evidence in a civil trial. Why is it that these safety measures are viewed differently by the Legislature? In the pursuit of egalitarianism, there seems to be no apparent basis for failure to wear a seat belt to be treated differently in the courts than failure to wear a helmet. Due to the similarity of the subject matter, the Pennsylvania Courts may soon hear a case that presents that very question.
In summary, in Gaudio v. Ford Motor Company et al. the Superior Court reinforced the plain language of the statue that prohibits a party from introducing evidence regarding a plaintiff's failure to wear a seat belt. It seems that for the time being, any change in the seatbelt laws will have to come from the Legislature and not the courts.
1 Subsection (d) of 75 Pa.C.S.A. § 3525 states "the provisions of subsection (a) shall not apply to the following:
- (1) The operator or any occupant of a three-wheeled motorcycle equipped with an enclosed cab.
- (2) A person 21 years of age or older who has been licensed to operate a motorcycle for not less than two full calendar years.
- (3) A person 21 years of age or older who has completed a motorcycle rider safety course approved by the department or the Motorcycle Safety Foundation.
- (4) The passenger of a person exempt under this subsection if the passenger is 21 years of age or older.
